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CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING WAR:
HISTORY'S INSTITUTIONAL LESSONS
ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME. By William H. Rehnquist. 1 New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1998. Pp. 254. $26.00.
Margaret A. Garvin

2

What! will you never cease prating of laws to us that have
swords by our sides?
Pompey Magnus

3

Of course the existence of a military power resting on force,
so vagrant, so centralized, so necessarily heedless of the individual, is an inherent threat to liberty. But I would not lead
people to rely on this Court for a review that seems to me
wholly delusive .... If the people ever let command of the war
power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the
courts wield no power equal to its restraint. The chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the
country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to
4
the moral judgments of history.

I. Chief Justice, United State Supreme Court.
2. Law Oerk to the Honorable Donald P. Lay, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. J.D. University of Minnesota, 1999, M.A. University of Iowa, 1994.
Thanks to Joan Garvin for her patient review of earlier drafts of this paper and for her
willingness to re·visit Latin. Thanks also to Professor Michael Paulsen, specifically for
reviewing drafts of this piece, but more importantly for three years of artful teaching.
Portions of this paper were greatly aided by the work of Diedre McGrath and Heather
Esau, Korematsu v. United States: 'Legalized Racism' and the Fallacy of Military Necessity, an unpublished piece prepared in Spring 1999; Richard Lau, A Poor Player's Hour
Upon the Stage: The Clement Vallandigham Affair, an unpublished paper prepared in Fall
1997 (on file with the author).
3. Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, "Pompey," in 13 Great
Books of the Western World 499,503 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1990).
4. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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In All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties In Wartime, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist crafts a compelling narrative of civil
liberties during times of declared war. Rehnquist devotes twothirds of the book to the Civil War, presenting that era as the
benchmark for later intersections of war and civil liberties. The
book details a consistent history of government relegation of
civil liberties to the backseat during times of war. 5
For anyone interested in history, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
book is an interesting story of the suspension and suppression of
civil liberties during wartime. From the very first line, history
comes to life as Rehnquist describes the cold, drizzly day in February 1861, when Abraham Lincoln set off to Washington D.C.
where he "hoped to be inaugurated." (p. 3) But for anyone interested in an analysis of the constitutionality of the suspensions,
All the Laws But One has surprisingly little to say. All the chapters, but one, are descriptive-they relate historical events, often
colorfully, but do not evaluate them. It is not until the concluding chapter that Rehnquist shifts into analysis and compares the
civil liberty infringements of the Civil War with those of the two
World Wars and poses normative constitutional questions regarding the propriety of such actions.
In this final chapter Rehnquist identifies three major differences among the infringements: first, the actor who worked the
suspension of civil liberties; second, the increasing role of the
courts since the Civil War; and third, a trend of government toward more tolerance of wartime criticism. Despite these differences, Rehnquist concludes that the maxim Inter arma silent leges, "In times of war the laws are silent," is an apt description for
the reality of civil liberties during war.

5. Rehnquist explicitly limits his discussion to times of declared war, asserting:
"[w)ithout question the government's authority to engage in conduct that infringes civil
liberty is greatest in time of declared war." (p. 218) Rehnquist's assertion is open to debate, but for purposes of this review the same limitation will be observed. Rehnquist's
restriction to times of declared war excludes many of the recent interactions between
civil liberties and "war" including those that occurred during the Korean and Vietnam
Wars. (The Civil War, however, though not a declared "war," is at the forefront of
Rehnquist's discussion.) The limitation precludes discussion of some of the more signifi·
cant Court decisions defining the scope of executive powers in times of undeclared war
or foreign affairs crisis. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). The exclusion of Youngstown is all the more interesting because of Rehnquist's role as law clerk for the Court at the time the case was heard, a
story told in Rehnquist's first book. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It
Was, How /tis 61-98 (Morrow and Co., 1987).
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In light of this conclusion Rehnquist poses two important
questions: first, whether the reluctance of courts to decide
against the government during war is a necessary evil or a desirable phenomenon; {p. 221) second, whether occasional presidential excesses and judicial restraint in wartime are desirable. (pp.
224-25) Disappointingly, however, Rehnquist, having raised
these questions, avoids bringing his vast constitutional experience to bear on them. This lack of critical analysis is evident
both in relation to the specific instances Rehnquist relates and in
his overall analysis of civil liberties during wartime. This deficiency would be tolerable except for the tantalizing moments
when Rehnquist enters the debate and condemns the wartime
actions only to retreat without supporting his position.
In Part I of this review, I examine the key historical events
discussed in Chief Justice Rehnquist's book and note particular
instances where he stops short of analyzing the important questions at stake. In Part II, I review the overall story told by the
episodes and attempt to answer Rehnquist's final questionwhether judicial restraint during war is desirable.
I. HISTORICAL INTERSECTIONS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

AND WAR
A. THE CIVIL W AR

6

1. Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Lincoln came to office as a sectionally elected president and
immediately confronted a country literally splitting apart with
the early secessions of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. (pp. 3-4) Barely a month af6. Rehnquist focuses on a handful of key incidents during the Civil War, and this
review traces those incidents. The only episode in Rehnquist's book excluded from this
review is the death of President Lincoln and the cast of characters who either helped orchestrate the events of that night or aided after-the-fact. While some of the alleged conspirators may have had their rights violated during the investigation and court proceedings, these acts occurred after the war and seem to arise more out of frenzied patriotism
than a systematic denial or trumping of civil liberties by a government. For studies of the
Lincoln administration and civil liberties, see James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems
Under Lincoln (U. of Illinois Press, revised cd. I95I); Robert S. Harper, Lincoln And
The Press (McGraw-Hill, I95I); Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Libeny: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (Oxford U. Press, I99I); Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Va//andigham, and Anti- War Speech in the Civil War, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. I 05 (I 998).
See also James M. McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom: The Civil War Era 287-90 (Oxford
U. Press, 1988).
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ter the inauguration, on April 12, 1861, confederate forces of
South Carolina fired on Fort Sumter. Two days later, Union
troops surrendered the Fort. (p. 15) Lincoln immediately summoned the active duty militia. In response to Lincoln's call to
arms, several more states seceded, including Virginia. Coupled
with Maryland's threatened secession, this left the Capital nearly
surrounded by secessionists and their sympathizers. (pp. 16-18)
When Massachusetts, in answer to Lincoln's call, sent troops to
Washington, the troops made it as far as Baltimore, where confederate sympathizers attacked them. (pp. 20-21) The governor
of Maryland then shut down the rail lines, essentially cutting off
Washington from reinforcements. 7 (pp. 21-22)
It was in this context that Lincoln first authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus on April 27, 1861. (p. 25)
In a letter addressed to Lieutenant General Scott, Commanding
General of the Army, Lincoln wrote:
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the
laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity
of the [) military line, which is now [or which shall be] used
between the City of Philadelphia and the City of Washington ... you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you,
personally or through the officer in command at the point
where ... resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that
8
writ.

On May 25, 1861, Union forces arrested John Merryman for
speaking out against the Union, recruiting soldiers to serve in
the Confederate Army, and participating in the destruction of
raillines. 9 (p. 21) Merryman petitioned Chief Justice Roger Taney for a writ of habeas corpus. Taney issued the writ on May
26, 1861. Citing Lincoln's suspension of the writ, General
George Cadwalader refused to comply and Chief Justice Taney
immediately issued an attachment for contempt. (p. 33) When
the dispatched marshal was refused entrance at the fort, Taney
10
wrote his famous opinion in Ex parte Merryman. (p. 34)
7. McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom at 90 (cited in note 6).
8. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Winfield Scott (April 27, 1861), in Roy P.
Basler, ed., 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 347 (Rutgers U. Press 1953).
9. See also Sherrill Halbert, Lincoln Suspends the Writ of Habeas Corpus, in Allan
Nevins and Irving Stone, eds., Lincoln: A Contemporary Portrait 95,98 (1962).
10. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). One of the more interesting
character sketches that Chief Justice Rehnquist draws is that of Chief Justice Taney.
Rehnquist describes Taney's political history from his position as Attorney General under President Andrew Jackson to his appointment to the Court in 1835. (pp. 27-28)
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Taney's opinion is a vigorous defense of the position that
Congress alone has the power to suspend the writ. The opinion
is grounded in an analysis of the structure of the Constitution;
the placement of the suspension clause in Article I; the executive's duty to faithfully carry out the laws; and a re~ection of the
1
argument that necessity trumps the Constitution. (pp. 36-38)
Recognizing his lack of power to enforce the decision, Taney
sent a copy to President Lincoln, noting in the opinion that "[i]t
will then remain for that high officer, in fulfillment of his constitutional obligation to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' to determine what measures he will take to cause the civil
12
process of the United States to be respected and enforced." (p.
38)
Despite this direct appeal, Lincoln all but ignored the Merryman decision until Congress reconvened in July. He then argued two points: 1) the exigency of the situation demanded that
he act pursuant to his higher duty of protecting the union from
destruction; and 2) no laws had been broken because the execu13
tive possesses independent authority to suspend the writ. On
July 5, 1861, Attorney General Edward Bates presented a further defense of the actions arguing that the branches of govern14
ment are coordinate and coequal. (p. 44) Congress took no
immediate action in the face of this exchange between the judiciary and the executive. 15
Rehnquist then describes the infamous Dred Scott decision of March 6, 1857, in which
the Court held that slaves could not be citizens and that Congress lacked the authority to
enact the Missouri Compromise. This decision evoked hugely negative public response,
including Lincoln's, in the North. As Rehnquist describes, Lincoln's response went from
a mild criticism to a stinging rejection. In his first inaugural address, Lincoln made a
thinly-veiled criticism of the decision: "the candid citizen must confess that if the policy
of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably
fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they arc made, in ordinary litigation
between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers,
having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal." Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861), in 4 The
Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln at 249, 268 (cited in note 8). Rehnquist uses this
history to set the scene for the later interaction between Lincoln and Taney following the
Merryman decision.
II. Ex Pane Merryman, 17 F. at 146-49.
12. Id at 153.
13. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4
The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln at 421-41 (cited in note 8).
14. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 76 (1861). For elaboration sec Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation,
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 81,95-97 (1993).
15. "President Lincoln claimed the right for the Executive .... Congress, in the face
of this claim, chose to do nothing." Halbert, Lincoln Suspends the Writ at 110 (cited in
note 9). The Thirty-seventh Congress did debate the issue of authority to suspend but it
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Rehnquist is critical of the dialogue between Lincoln and
Taney on two grounds: First, Rehnquist finds Lincoln's response
to Taney to be rhetorical rather than legal. He notes that Lincoln was "the advocate at his very best." (p. 38) Second,
Rehnquist is critical of Taney's hasty decision-makinp that ignored the deliberative nature of the judicial process. 1 (pp. 4041) Rehnquist does not, however, critically engage either of the
two important constitutional questions that arise from Lincoln's
suspension of the writ: 1) which branch of government has the
power to suspend the writ; and 2) whether Lincoln's rejection of
Taney's Merryman decision was constitutionally proper.
Rehnquist essentially ignores the first question despite the prolific literature on the topic. 17 With respect to the latter question,
Rehnquist flatly asserts that the proposition that the President is
not subordinate to the judicial branch "had been refuted by
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison more
than half a century earlier." (p. 44) This one line dismissal of
the argument ignores a well-developed and very contentious
academic debate regarding the power of the executive branch to
engage in independent constitutional interpretation. 18 While
was not until March 3, 1863, that Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, which
tacitly approved of Lincoln's acts. See Randall, Constitutional Problems at 130 (cited in
note 6). The language of the Act can be read either as a grant of authority to the president or as a recognition of a pre-existing power. ld Interestingly, even after the passage
of this Act, Lincoln continued to justify the suspension on either his independent constitutional power or on the situational exigencies; his cabinet, however, began to rely on the
Act. See Neely, Civil Libenies And Civil War at 68 (cited in note 6).
16. Rehnquist's analysis here provides insight into his view of how law and judicial
review ought to work. He notes that "(t]he fact that (Taney] may have reached the correct result on the merits of the case cannot excuse this want of process." (p. 41)
Rehnquist eventually falls prey to this same deficiency when he fails to engage the wellformed debates regarding the constitutionality of executive autonomy.
17. Sec, e.g., Randall, Constitutional Problems at 118-39 (cited in note 6); William
F. Duker, A Constitutional History Of Habeas Corpus 24 (Greenwood Press, 1980); Martin S. Sheffer, Presidential Power 10 Suspend Habeas Corpus: The Taney- Bates Dialogue
and Ex Parte Merryman, 11 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1 (1986); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
War and the Constitution: Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt, in Grabor S.
Boritt, ed., Lincoln, The War President 152 (Oxford U. Press, 1992); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Prerogative: Abraham Lincoln and American Constitutionalism, in Frank J. Williams and William D. Pederson, cds., Abraham Lincoln: Contemporary 135, 140 (Savas
Woodbury Pub., 1995).
18. See the symposium in 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1-523 (1993)-cspecially Paulsen, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 81 (cited in note 14); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the
Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113 (1993); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as
Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L. Rev 43 (1993); Michael
Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on
Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 137
(1993). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power
to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L. Rev. 217 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, The President's
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Rehnquist gives his reader a palpable sense of history, he offers
no thoughtful evaluation of the lawfulness of Lincoln's suspension of the writ or of the Lincoln administration's assertion that
coequal branches of government possess coequal power to interpret the Constitution. For those the reader must turn elsewhere.
2. The Vallandigham Affair-Military Arrests and Trials
On September 24, 1862, Lincoln issued a proclamation providing that persons "discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid
and comfort to Rebels" should "be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by Courts Martial or Military
Commission." 19 (p. 60) Pursuant to this directive, on April 19,
1863, General Ambrose Burnside, the Commanding General of
the Department of Ohio, issued General Order 38. 20 General
Order 38 provided, in part, that "'[t]he habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy' ... would no longer be tolerated in the Department of the Ohio; persons 'committing such offenses' would
be arrested and subject to military procedures." (p. 63)
In a speech on May 1, 1863, Clement L. Vallandigham denounced President Lincoln, the war policies, and General Order
38. 21 (pp. 65-66) Four days later General Burnside ordered
Vallandigham's arrest. (p. 66) He was tried before a military
commission, found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for the
duration of the war. (p. 67) Lincoln eventually commuted the
sentence to banishment from the Union. 22 Vallandigham sought
a writ of habeas corpus from District Judge Humphrey H.
Leavitt but was denied. (p. 67) Vallandigham sought review of
the denial from the Supreme Court-but the Court held the military commission's actions unreviewable:

Power of Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 35 (1993); Christopher L. Eisgrubcr, The Most Competent Branches:

A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 Gco. Law. Rev. 347 (1994); Gary Lawson and Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev.
1267 (1996); Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 259·65 (Yale U. Press, 2d ed. 1986 ).
19. Curtis, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 117·18 (cited in note 6 ).
20. Frank L. Klement, The Limits Of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham & The Civil
War 149 (U. Press of Kentucky, 1970).
21. Curtis, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 121 (cited in note 6 ).
22. Despite internal discussions among Lincoln and his cabinet disagreeing with
Burnside's summary action, banishment of Vallandigham was the only official action
taken by the executive. (p. 67) Sec Klement, The Limits Of Dissent at 177 (cited in note
20); Curtis, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts.J. at 136 (cited in note 6).
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Whatever may be the force of Vallandigham's protest, that he
was not triable by a court of military commission, it is certain
that his petition cannot be brought within the [Judiciary Act
of 1789); and further, that the court cannot, without disregarding its frequent decisions and interpretations of the Constitution in respect to its judicial power, originate a writ of
certiorari to review or pronounce any opinion upon the proceedings of a military commission. 23

Lincoln came under heavy criticism for the V allandigham
Affair. This criticism included a set of resolutions drafted in
May 1863 at a meeting of Democrats in Albany, New York. 24 In
response to the Albany Resolves Lincoln articulated two defenses: first, the entire country was a war zone and military arrests were justified anywhere the enemy used speech or the press
to conduct war; and second, the arrest was not for Vallandigham's speaking in public but for his war on the military.
(pp. 72-73) In this defense, Lincoln used his famous line, "Must
I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must
not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?" 25
(p. 73)
Rehnquist criticizes the Vallandigham Affair on two fronts.
First, Vallandigham's trial and conviction by the military commission were based on violation of a General's order, not an Act
of Congress or state legislature-the proper grounds for charging a defendant. (p. 68) Second, the asserted authority under
which Vallandigham was prosecuted and convicted was Lincoln's proclamation of martial law; yet the scope and definition
of martial law was unclear at the time. (pp. 68-72) Each of these
criticisms presents an interesting challenge to the constitutionality of the actions taken in the Vallandigham Affair; yet,
Rehnquist merely identifies them and does not analyze or evaluate them. Instead, Rehnquist merely asserts that "Lincoln's defense of his actions ... was addressed to the general public, and
not to constitutional lawyers." (p. 73) The same is true of
Rehnquist's description of events.

23. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243,251-52 (1863). The Court never addressed
the scope of the military's authority although it did note that it presumed the President
was conscious of his constitutional limits and that he would act within them. Id
24. Neely, Fate of Liberty at196 (cited in note 6).
25. Curtis, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 160-62 (cited in note 6). Sec also McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom at 598-99 (cited in note 6).
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3. The Indianapolis Treason Trials-the Milligan Case
Less than two years after the Vallandigham Affair the Court
faced a parallel case. In October 1864, General Alvin Hovey,
Commander of Indianapolis, ordered the arrest of a group of
26
men for conspiracy against the United States. (pp. 83, 90-99)
Milligan and the others were tried before a military commission
and, on relatively minimal evidence, (pp. 89-100) were convicted
and sentenced to hang. (p. 102) Milligan petitioned the Circuit
Court for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that a military court
could not impose sentence on civilians who were not in a theater
of war. The Circuit Court certified the question to the Supreme
Court and arguments were set for March, 1866. (pp. 104, 117)
The government argued that imposition of martial law allowed military commissions to hear cases and that only military
authority could review the determinations of such commissions.
Further, the government argued that the Bill of Rights was composed of '"peace provisions of the Constitution, and like all
other conventional and legislative laws and enactments are silent
amidst arms, and when the safety of the people becomes the supreme law."' (p. 121) The petitioners argued that martial law
could be imposed only by Congress and only where necessitated
by war and, moreover, that civil liberties do not disappear during
war. (pp. 121-27) On April 3, 1866, the Court entered an order
directing the writ of habeas corpus to issue. (p. 128) The Court
explicitly recognized the importance of timing to its decision:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did
not allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial question.
Then, considerations of safety were mingled with the exercise
of power; and feelings ... prevailed which are happily terminated. Now that the public safety is assured, this question, as
well as all others, can be discussed and decided without passion or the admixture of any element not required to form a
27
legal judgment.

The Court concluded that martial law could not exist from a
merely threatened invasion but required a real invasion; more-

26. Randall, Constitutional Problems at 181 (cited in note 6). Rehnquist identifies a
curious fact about the Milligan arrests: the charges and specifications brought against the
defendants made no reference to any specific federal statute that criminalized their conduct. (pp. 84-87) Rehnquist describes this discrepancy between the military commission's charges and the law but does not discuss the ramifications of such discrepancy.
27. Ex pane Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 109 (1866).
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over, "[m]artial rule can never exist where courts are open, and
in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction."28
(p. 131) The majority opinion went on to state that even Congress could not provide for trial by a military commission. 29 (p.
131).
In discussing the Court's decision in Milligan, Rehnquist
criticizes its form but not its content. He chastises the Court for
its dicta regarding the scope of Congress' power, concluding that
the Court ignored the traditional rule of not reaching constitutional issues if not necessary. 30 (pp. 134-36) Again Rehnquist
does not evaluate the merits of the case; rather, he makes an
unargued-for judgment that "[t]he Milligan decision is justly
celebrated for its rejection of the government's position that the
Bill of Rights has no application in wartime." (p. 137, emphasis
added) While civil libertarians may agree with such a conclusion, Rehnquist presents no constitutional argument to justify it.
B. WORLD WAR I - THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

Rehnquist turns to the First World War as the next great
occasion when war came into conflict with civil liberties. He discusses the initial isolationist policy of the United States and the
preparedness movement, including the enactment of the conscription law. (p. 172) The focus of the chapter, however, is the
Espionage Act passed in June 1917, and the amendments
thereto, known as the Sedition Act. Title I, Section Three of the
Act criminalized any interference with military operations and
any acts causing "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal
of duty"; Title XII, Section Two declared certain materials unmailable if they contained "any matter advocating or urging
treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the
31
United States. " (p. 173)
Rehnquist surveys a number of cases decided under this
Act. 32 He begins with the arrest and conviction of Charles T.
28. Id. at 127.
29. Id. at 121-22.
30. Rehnquist defends this rule by noting that the Court's dicta led to later problems. Specifically, he refers to the World War II case of Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942), which involved the trial of Richard Quirin and seven other German soldiers who
landed on the United States shore with the intent to bomb. A military tribunal was established to hear the case. The Court upheld the government's action but had to strain
to distinguish the Milligan dicta regarding the scope and timing of military commissions.
31. 40 Stat. 217,219,230 (1917).
32. Most thoroughly, Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v.
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Schenck for mailing leaflets opposing conscription. (p. 174) In
upholding Schenck's conviction the Supreme Court announced
its "clear and present danger" test by which to judge whether
speech is protected by the First Amendment. (p. 174) The
Schenck Court expressly recognized that the timing of the casewar time-affected the outcome: "When a nation is at war many
things which might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight ... no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right. "34 (p. 174) Rehnquist contends that
Schenck "put some flesh and bones on the First Amendment"
but that the test established was less than clear. (p. 174) Without more, he turns to other incidents and court decisions following Schenck.
Rehnquist does not thoroughly analyze the constitutionality
of any of the incidents or cases he identifies nor does he provide
a clear picture of how the First Amendment should work during
war. In fact, Rehnquist rarely injects himself into the discussion
of these cases. He does, however, make two points: First, he
criticizes the Court's failure to distinguish between actual advocacy of unlawfulness and strongly worded criticism and notes, "if
freedom of speech is to be meaningful, strong criticism of government policy must be permitted even in wartime .... Advocacy which persuades citizens that a law is unjust is not the same
as advocacy that preaches disobedience to it." (p. 178) Thus,
Rehnquist provides a terse statement of his view of protected
speech but does not address the courts' constitutional analysis or
articulate a more appropriate test for the First Amendment
during war. Rehnquist's second point is that later cases do not
follow logically from the "clear and present danger" test of
Schenck. (p. 182) But he refrains from going further and analyzing this disjuncture or positing a resolution.
Rehnquist, however, does draw some generalizations regarding the state of civil liberties during World War I as compared with the Civil War. He asserts that the Wilson administration, like the Lincoln administration, desired to suppress
criticism of the war. (p. 182) He then identifies several differences: during World War I, it was Congress, as opposed to the

United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
33. Sec Richard Polcnberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, The Supreme Court,
And Free Speech 212 (Viking, 1987).
34. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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president, that acted; judicial review occurred more often; there
was no suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; there were no
trials of civilians before military courts (although Congress attempted to authorize such); and while there were arrests and deportations, they occurred after hostilities ceased. (pp. 182-83)
Rehnquist does little beyond naming these five differences. The
only evaluative comment is one made summarily: "Though the
courts during this period gave little relief to civil liberties claimants, the very fact that the claims were being reviewed by the judiciary was a step in the right direction for proponents of civil
liberties during wartime." (p. 182) Rehnquist applauds judicial
review during wartime but does not say what the substance of
that review should be. He provides a clear and concise description of the war cases, but without any evaluation or argument.
C. WORLDWARII
1. The Japanese Internment
Rehnquist presents a brief overview of the beginnings of
World War II, including Pearl Harbor and the effect that that attack had on the west coast's fear of imminent invasion and view
of persons of Japanese ancestry. (pp. 184-90) On February 19,
1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 that
gave the Secretary of War the legal power to exclude all persons,
citizens and aliens, from designated areas on the west coast. 35 (p.
192) On March 21, 1942, Congress passed a law imposing criminal penalties for violating the Order or any regulations promulgated to implement it. (p. 192) The regulations passed pursuant
to the order included a curfew, a requirement to report to relocation centers, and the removal of persons from designated areas.36 (p. 192) These regulations resulted in four cases reaching
the Supreme Court-those involving Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Y asui, Fred Korematsu and Mitsuye Endo.
In Hirabayashi 31 and Yasui 38 the Court narrowed the scope
of review to the issue of the curfew and unanimously upheld the
regulation. (p. 198) The Court cited the pervasiveness of the
35. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942). On its face the order was not
racially based; however, it was commonly understood to be targeted at the Japanese.
36. See Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of Constitutional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perceptive, 19 U. Haw. L. Rev. 649,
651 (1997).

37.
38.

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)
Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943)
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war power and found that the "war power of the national gov39
ernment is 'the power to wage war successfully'." (p. 199) The
Court did not engage in an independent analysis of the govern40
ment's alleged facts regarding the military threat. Instead, the
Court concluded as follows:
That reasonably prudent men charged with the responsibility
of our national defense had ample ground for concluding that
they must face the danger of invasion, take measures against
it, and in making the choice of measures consider our internal
41
situation, cannot be doubted.

The Court decided the Korematsu case next, addressing the
general relocation program. (p. 200) Again the Court upheld
42
the conviction-although no longer unanimously. The majority
opinion relied on the Hirabayashi decision, again did not identify
any independent evidence of military necessity or imminent
danger from Japanese-Americans, and again deferred to the
43
government. (pp. 200-01)
44
The fourth case, Endo, was argued and decided at the
same time as Korematsu. The issue in this case was not a direct
challenge to the regulations; instead, Endo sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming that she could not be held after proving her
loyalty. The Court unanimously agreed that Endo was entitled
to be released. It based this decision on the scope of the Act of
Congress and the Executive Order rather than on the Constitution but hinted that there might be constitutional difficulties as
well. (pp. 201-02)
Rehnquist briefly injects commentary at this point, recognizing the importance of timing to these decisions, yet asserting
that timing ought not to dictate outcomes. (p. 202) He does not
specifically analyze the rationales or constitutional reasoning of
the Court in any of the cases. However, in the book's most inventive and critical chapter, Chapter 16, Rehnquist engages and
analyzes the post-war criticisms of the Japanese relocation and
internment programs. First, he asserts that the Court's decision
39. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93 (citation omitted).
40. Grossman, 19 U. Haw. L. Rev. at 659 (cited in note 36).
41. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94.
42. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Justices Roberts, Jackson, and
Murphy dissented.
43. For a discussion of the Court's failure to identify independent evidence sec
Leslie T. Hatamiya, Righting A Wrong: Japanese Americans and the Passage of the Civil
Liberties Act of /988 at 218 (Stanford U. Press, 1993).
44. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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to deal only with the curfew in Hirabayashi was one grounded in
the well-established and sensible rule of avoiding constitutional
decision-making when possible. (p. 205) Second, while admitting that too much deference to government is troubling, he recognizes inherent and institutional difficulties of reviewing military judgments. (p. 205) Third, he analyzes the criticisms of
racism leveled against the programs and notes that, while some
of the criticism is justified, there should be a distinction between
the Issei-immigrants from Japan, and the Nisei-the children
of those immigrants born in the United States and therefore citizens of this country by birth. (pp. 203, 206) Finally, Rehnquist
argues that while there were different treatments of the German
and Italian nationals during the war, there may have been facts
sufficient to differentiate these situations. (p. 211)
2. Martial Law in Hawaii
Just hours after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the territorial
governor of Hawaii issued a proclamation of martial law and
45
suspended the writ of habeas corpus. (p. 212) Pursuant to this
proclamation, Lieutenant General Walter Short became the
military governor of Hawaii and issued a number of orders
regulating conduct of citizens. (pp. 212-13) A number of cases
challenging martial law came before the federal courts and
caused a great deal of tension between the federal courts and the
military command. One such case involved Judge Delbert
Metzger, a federal district judge, who issued a show cause order
for two imprisoned naturalized German-Americans. (pp. 21415) Lieutenant General Robert Richardson, Commander of the
Military Department of Hawaii, successfully evaded the marshall
who was attempting to serve the order. (p. 215) This stand-off
resulted in Metzger declaring Richardson in contempt of court
and Richardson ordering Metzger to retract and no longer issue
writs of habeas corpus. (pp. 214-15) Only the intervention of
the Secretary of War prevented the issue from being litigated
further. (p. 215)
A later challenge to martial law did progress through the
court system but only after the war had ended-Duncan v. Kahanamoku.% Two American-born citizens were convicted and
45. For an in-depth discussion of martial law in Hawaii, see Harry N. Scheiber and
Jane L. Scheiber, Bayonets in Paradise: A Half-Cenrury Retrospect on Marcial Law in
Hawai'i, 1941-1946, 19 U. Haw. L. Rev. 477 (1997).
46. 327 u.s. 304 (1946).
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sought a writ of habeas corpus; the Supreme Court held that the
District Court's issuance of the writ was proper. (p. 216) Justice
Black wrote for the Court and concluded that the Act that
authorized martial law did not intend the military regime to su47
persede the civilian regime any more than war necessitated. (p.
216)
Rehnquist briefly considers the importance of post-war
timing to the Duncan decision and contends that the crimes at
issue, embezzling and brawling, could not easily be classified as
national security threats. (p. 217) He then asserts that even
during the more restrictive Civil War there was never a suggestion that military courts try ordinary civilian crimes. (p. 217)
Based on these brief observations, Rehnquist concludes: "The
post-World War II court surely reached the right result in
Duncan." (p. 217, emphasis added) Although, Rehnquist's conclusion may be correct, he does not argue for it or provide any
foundation to support it. The reader is left with yet another description of events with no analysis of the constitutionality of the
acts.
II. THE REALITY OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WAR
I do not think [President Roosevelt] was much concerned
with the gravity or implications of this step. He was never
theoretical about things. What must be done to defend the
country must be done .... Nor do I think that the constitutional difficulty plagued him- the Constitution has never
greatly bothered any wartime President. 48

Rehnquist's book provides a survey of civil liberties during
wartime that, taken together, shows that war efforts will take
precedence over civil liberties during the perceived crisis. According to Rehnquist's analysis there are significant differences
among these historical intrusions: 1) the actor who worked the
49
intrusion; 2) the courts more often reviewed cases during the
World Wars, resulting in more Supreme Court precedent; (p.
220) and 3) the administrations moved away from the "heavy-

47. ld at 316-17.
48. Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 219 (Doubleday & Co., 1962).
49. During the Civil War, President Lincoln's unilateral actions resulted in civil liberty infringements; during World War I, the Postmaster General acted pursuant to congressional authorization; during World War II, President Roosevelt acted-but was rapidly supported by Congress and endorsed by the courts. (p. 219)
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handed" approach of the Civil War toward World War II's lack
of any generalized effort to condemn criticism. 50 (p. 221)
Regardless of these differences, review by the Supreme
Court has historically followed a predictable pattern: in all the
cases, but one, review during times of war has resulted in a decision upholding government action (Vallandigham, Schenck,
Abrams, Hirabayashi, Korematsu); 51 whereas, post-war review
has provided the occasion for judicial rejection of executive or
congressional excesses and reinvigoration of civil liberties (Milligan, Endo, Duncan). The Court's review during time of war can
be classified into three types of decision: 1) decisions upholding
the executive/congressional action; 2) decisions holding the issue
non-justiciable or outside the Court's jurisdiction; and 3) decisions holding against the executive/congressional action. Interestingly, each of these outcomes led to a negative impact on civil
liberties.
First, as Rehnquist's history reveals, when the Supreme
Court reviews cases and reaches the merits during times of war it
tends to uphold executive action, accepting executive claims of
necessity and deferring to the President. Korematsu is the most
egregious example of the Court genuflecting to executive claims.
The Supreme Court accepted the War and Justice Departments'
assertions of emergency and threat with little or no independent
analysis of the basis of those claims. 52 This acceptance of the executive's claims is not necessarily due to any malfeasance on the
part of the judiciary; rather, both institutional and human limita53
tions may act to restrain judicial review during war. Regardless, Korematsu is the rule, not the exception: courts finding
themselves at the mercy of executive characterizations of war often accept those characterizations. The long-term impact of
50. Rehnquist identifies the Lincoln era as the most egregious in terms of aggressive infringements on civil liberties. This point can be debated. Sec, e.g., Neely, Fate of
Liberty (cited in note 6); Randall, Constitutional Problems (cited in note 6).
51. The exception was Chief Justice Taney's decision in Merryman.
52. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218. Peter Irons conducted intense post·war investigation into the government's assertion of military necessity and threat from the JapaneseAmerican population and argues that racism rather than necessity guided the action and
that the War and Justice Departments each were guilty of suppressing critical information. Sec Peter lrons,lustice At War (Oxford U. Press, 1983).
53. Sec Christopher N. May, In The Name Of War: Judicial Review and the War
Powers Since 1918 at 256 (Harvard U. Press, 1989) (pointing out that judges face obstacles in obtaining necessary information for resolving questions); Clinton Rossiter and
Richard P. Longaker, The Supreme Court And The Commander In Chief91 (Cornell U.
Press, expanded cd. 1976) (arguing that courts and judges are not immune to nationalism
and a desire to win the war).
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blindly upholding executive action, as the Court did in Korematsu, is the creation of a questionable line of precedents. Alexander Bickel has noted the legitimating function of judicial review: "Not only is the Supreme Court capable of generating
consent for hotly controverted legislative or executive measures;
it has the subtler power of adding a certain impetus to measures
that the majority enacts rather tentatively." 54 Consequently, after the war we are left with precedents of expanded governmental power, and diminished civil liberty, that the Supreme Court
has blessed with its stamp of constitutional approval. Thus, "[b]y
engaging in what was merely a formal exercise, the justices not
only denied relief to the aggrieved individuals but left behind a
55
series of decisions which are still part of our constitutionallaw."
These precedents may result in increased restrictions on individual civil liberties both post-war and, importantly, during the next
war.
Second, the Court may invoke doctrines of justiciability to
avoid deciding a question. During the Civil War the Court faced
the case of Val/andigham and held that it had no jurisdiction to
review the actions of a military commission. By adopting this
stance the Court permitted power to go unchecked. Even more
troubling, the Court's decision could have resulted in permanent
abdication of review; the Court, however, was fortunate enough
to be confronted with a parallel case immediately post-warMilligan. As discussed above, the only substantive difference between Vallandigham and Milligan was timing-the former occurred during the war and the Court chose to avoid its adjudication, while the latter occurred post-war and the Court granted
review. While the Court did eventually reverse itself in terms of
review of military commissions, such an about-face is not always
accomplished easily. Thus, while certain justiciability doctrines
may aid the Court in deferring cases until independent post-war
review is possible, others risk permanent forfeiture of review.
Third, when courts exercise independent review and hold
against the executive they risk executive rejection of their
56
authority. While this has only occurred once, in Ex parte Mer54. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 30-31 (cited in note 18).
55. May, In The Name Of War at 264 (cited in note 53). Although the Korematsu
decision has been questioned by many, it is still considered good Jaw.
. 56. Most scholars agree that the President has an obligation to enforce specific
judgments rendered by courts regardless of his or her own interpretation of the constitutionalit~ thereof. Michael Stokes Paulsen is the exception to this, arguing that the execullve IS a fully co-equal branch. Sec Paulsen, 83 Geo. L. R. 217 (cited in note 18). Cf.
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ryman, the potential for executive rejection exists. Rehnquist
dismisses such presidential power as unconstitutional. As noted
earlier, this dismissal ignores the very live academic debate regarding the scope and degree of executive autonomy. 57 Thus, despite Rehnquist's repudiation of Lincoln's actions, history and
constitutional theory reveal the executive might refuse to defer
to the Court's judgment.
After presenting a history demonstrating these three negative possibilities of wartime review, Rehnquist fails to describe
an alternative image of how or when the courts should act during
war. The outcomes illustrated by the described episodes all fall
short of an ideal Court acting as a check on the executive and
protector of civil liberties.
A possible alternative view of the Court's role can be found
in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 58 the landmark case on
which a young William Rehnquist worked as a law clerk for Justice Robert Jackson, a story Rehnquist told at length in one of
his earlier books, but does not discuss in All the Laws But One.
Justice Jackson's famous concurrence in Youngstown articulated
a three-tiered analysis of executive authority.
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify
the federal sovereignty.... When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he
can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this
area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather
than on abstract theories of law .... When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain
Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1321-24 (cited in note 18); Steven G. Calabrcsi,
Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1421, 1425 (1999).
57. Sec notes 18 and 56.
58. 343 u.s. 579 (1952).
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exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling
59
the Congress from acting upon the subject.

Justice Jackson was specifically talking about the scope of presidential powers. But his analysis can be mapped onto judicial review of wartime actions to determine the proper timing of such
review.
What was crucial in Youngstown was that not only was
President Truman's conduct unauthorized by Congress, but in
fact, it ran contrary to an existing statutory process for handling
labor disputes. 60 This stands in contrast to the wartime events
described in Rehnquist's book. In those cases Congress preapproved the executive's actions, quickly acted to ratify them, or
chose not to respond immediately. The executive always acted
either within its own prescribed powers or at least within Jackson's "twilight zone" of power.
Employing Jackson's Youngstown approach, coupled with
61
what Alexander Bickel has labeled the "passive virtues" -those
techniques of the Court allowing it to not decide a case-one can
construct a methodology for the timing of judicial review of wartime actions. When the executive acts during war with either
explicit or implicit authorization of Congress it is acting with
considerable authority. During these times the judiciary ought
to remain silent until post-war when it can act independently,
deliberatively, and with less risk of executive rejection. If, however, the executive branch acts contrary to an explicit position of
Congress, its power is at its "lowest" ebb and the Court ought to
act, even during war. When the Court reviews such unilateral
and unsupported executive actions it can avoid the pitfalls exhibited by history and can truly act as a check on the executive.
Only when two branches of government independently reach the
conclusion that executive action is unconstitutional are the benefits of the Court's temporary silence outweighed by the need for
a check on the executive's power.
While post-war review does not rectify the indignities exacted on individuals during the war, it can provide precedents
which may curtail future governmental excesses. As Christopher
May has noted:
59. ld at 635-38 (Justice, J ., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
60. May, In The Name Of War at 259 (cited in note 53).
61. See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 111-98 (cited in note 18); Alexander
M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L.
Rev. 40 (1961).
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Delaying review without foregoing it entirely strengthens the
Constitution in time of emergency. This "technique of the
mediating middle" allows the executive to act unencumbered
while the crisis rages, while helping to ensure that its conduct
will not become an exercise in tyranny. Those who wield
emergency power will act with the knowledge that they may
later have to answer for their conduct. If judges defer intervention until they are able to function in an independent
manner, courts can play an important role in this process of
accounta b 1'l'1ty.62

Thus, if the Court refrains from reviewing cases during war when
the executive is acting either at the height of its power or in the
twilight zone, it may avoid the pitfalls exhibited by the episodes
related by Chief Justice Rehnquist and yet preserve the opportunity for significant post-war decision-making.
CONCLUSION
Rehnquist poses the question of whether occasional presidential excesses and judicial restraint during wartime are desirable and concludes:
It is neither desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty
will occupy as favored a position in wartime as it does in
peacetime. But it is both desirable and likely that more careful attention will be paid by the courts to the basis for the
government's claims of necessity as a basis for curtailing civil
liberty. The laws will thus not be silent in time of war, but
they will speak with a somewhat different voice. (pp. 224-25)

While Rehnquist posits this move toward more careful court review and a "different voice" of laws, he stops short of describing
what this would look like or when it would occur. This rather
prosaic conclusion exemplifies Rehnquist's unexpected lack of
insight in addressing such an important issue.
If Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a book to entertain and intrigue, he has succeeded-but one expects more when reading a
book by the Chief Justice on issues of constitutional importance.
The title of Rehnquist's book refers to President Lincoln's message to Congress on July 4, 1861 and suggests that the book may
offer an answer to Lincoln's rhetorical question, "Are all the
laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go
to pieces, lest that one be violated?" While the title is enticing,
62.

May,/n The Name Of War at269 (cited in note 53).

1999]

BOOK REVIEWS

711

Rehnquist provides no answer to the question that Lincoln
posed. Instead, he concludes the book with a chapter entitled
Inter Arma Silent Leges, "In times of war the laws are silent." 63
This phrase, like most of Rehnquist's book, is merely descriptive
of the historical intersections of war and civil liberties.
Throughout the book Rehnquist exhibits a hesitance for openly
critiquing and analyzing the historical events that he relates and
leaves the reader with only a vacant sense of the errors of history
and no tangible alternative for the future. One possible alternative future can be culled from the episodes that Rehnquist relates. When the judiciary injects itself into wartime actions, in
any circumstance other than when the executive and Congress
disagree, the possible outcomes are negative. Perhaps the lesson
to be learned from Rehnquist's historical survey is that, generally, judicial review ought to be stayed during times of war and
that the proper maxim should be Silete leges enim inter arma,
"For the laws ought to be silent in times of war."

63. This Latin phrase is actually a paraphrase of the Ciceronian maxim: Silent enim
leges inter arnw, "During times of war the laws arc truly silent." The phrase is taken
from a speech Cicero wrote in defense of Titus Annius Milo who was on trial for murder
during a time of martial law and when the formal trial procedures were being arbitrarily
changed. Paul MacKendrick, The Speeches Of Cicero: Context, Law, Rhetoric 372
(Duckworth & Co., 1995). It is interesting to note the reversed arrangement of the
phrasing of the original line and the one employed by Rehnquist. Arrangement of Latin
IS governed by two elements: grammar and rhetoric. The rhetorical element effects em·
phasis and can specifically be produced by reversing the ordinary position of the words.
Sec B.L. Gildersleeve and Gonzalez Lodge, Gildersleeve's Latin Gramnwr 428-29 (Macmillan and Co., 3d cd. 1960). The removal of the modifier "enim" and the reversal of the
arrangement may be read to minimize the forcefulness of the phrase.

